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Representation, representativeness, and accountability in EU-civil 
society relations 
 
Beate Kohler-Koch 
 
1. Why bring in the concepts of representation, representativeness, and 
accountability? 
Representation, representativeness and accountability are core concepts in theories of 
democracy. In the debate on the democratic quality of the EU, the issues of representativeness 
and accountability are on the agenda, but not so the question of representation. One plausible 
explanation for the conspicuous absence of a discourse on representation is political: The 
principle of democratic representation is embodied in the institutional architecture of the EU 
as defined by the Treaties. When the Commission launched the debate on democratic 
governance it did not want to interfere with the on-going negotiations on institutional reform. 
Another plausible explanation is theoretical: Improving the democratic credentials of the 
Union was so densely linked to the concept of governance that the broader reflections of 
democratic theory were neglected (Trenz 2007:4). My own proposition is that the neglect of 
the concept of representation is caused by the self-propelling dynamics of the political 
discourse (Kohler-Koch 2007: 7-9). Political discourse takes in theoretical insights (though 
mostly only in bits and pieces), relying on what is widely disseminated and has news value 
and/or carries positive connotations. Theoretical arguments give meaning to political 
strategies; they define what the core of the problem is and what could be appropriate and 
useful strategies of problem solving. Discourse is a path-dependent process, it is pushed by 
interested actors – in this case coming both from the world of academia and the world of 
politics – and it responds to in-built rationalities of the argument as it evolves.  
The EU discourse on civil society emerged from a pledge to bring the EU closer to citizens 
and then became linked to the broader issue of democratic legitimacy. Academia deepened 
reflections on democracy, civil society and the public sphere in the post-national and multi-
level European constellation, and, in parallel, became more occupied with participatory 
governance. EU institutions pledged closer collaboration with civil society and step by step 
designed a new consultation regime. The institutional re-structuring of EU-society relations 
triggered controversial discussions about the concept of civil society - what it is, who qualifies 
to represent it, and what role should be attributed to civil society in the EU. The question of 
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democratic legitimacy came to the fore again, but this time centred on the issue of 
representativeness and accountability.  
Hans-Jörg Trenz, in response to an earlier version of this paper (Kohler-Koch 2007), 
suggested that research concentrate on “the reformative function of naming and framing” 
(Trenz 2007: 21). He has argued: “The representative and the mandatory function of civil 
society are assumed through multiple representative demands put forward by conflicting 
actors.” (ibid) I do not want to discard the high relevance of such a research strategy. But it is 
committed to a sociological research agenda, whereas my research agenda is influenced by a 
political science interest centred on democracy and the control of power. Consequently, I will 
first explicate the normative dimensions of representation and how representativeness and 
accountability fit in to make representation democratic. Then I will turn to explore the 
political conditions that channelled the discourse and the choice of mechanisms for bringing 
civil society into EU policy-making. Finally, I will develop an analytical model to assess the 
democratic value added of governance reforms. 
 
2. Representation: from an elusive concept to an analytical model 
What is representation about? Representation is a core concept in political thinking on 
democracy. It has been discussed in depth over several centuries and associated with quite 
different meanings (Hofmann 1974; Manin 1995). The understanding of representation is not 
only framed by different normative theories of democracy, but is also closely linked to 
historical practise, which in the case of Europe varies across countries and specific ideological 
contexts (Hofmann 1974: 35). Thus we should not be surprised that ‘representation’ is “a 
many-faceted and elusive concept” (Sartori 1968: 465). 
I side with those concepts in political theory that claim that political representation is not just 
a relation between a principle and an agent in which the represented mandates or instructs the 
representative. Rather, in contrast to delegation, I conceive of representation as giving 
presence to something that is “not present literally or in fact” (Pitkin 1967: 8f)1. Because the 
direct link between the representative and the represented has been severed, representation is 
closely linked to the idea of responsibility and accountability. Representational responsibility 
is more than responsiveness to the demands of a constituency or the reliability of a delegate. It 
also comprises the notion of “functional responsibility” (Sartori 1968: 468), of meeting given 
                                                 
1 “According to Pitkin representation is “the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless 
not present literally or in fact”, see: Hannah F. Pitkin (1967). For a similar statement see Carl Schmitt (1928/ 
1954: 209). 
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standards and adhering to established principles, norms, and rules. Representation is also 
closely associated with representativeness. Representativeness is a social phenomenon which 
implies similarity and like-mindedness. Since semblance does not come by chance and is not 
easy to appraise in a many-to-one relationship, procedures of accountability take precedence 
(Sartori 1968: 468).  
What is the essence of representation that makes it attractive for democracy? Some authors 
primarily attribute an instrumental value to representation since it facilitates democracy in a 
mass society by reducing the scale of participants in the political process without reducing the 
expression of social diversity. But a long tradition in political thinking values representation 
as a genuine component of democracy that safeguardes the equality of citizens, freedom, and 
minority rights.2 Though I might be accused of giving “historically bounded answers to 
modern questions” (Pollak 2007: 90) I will look at the core ideas in classic writings. At the 
heart of the argument was always the firm belief that “(…) government and legislation are 
matters of reason and judgment” and, therefore, “Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors 
from different and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain, as an agent and 
advocate, against other agents and advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one 
nation, with one interest, that of the whole (…) “(Burke (1774) 1969: 175).3 Accordingly, in 
Edmund Burke’s conception, the representative is a “trustee for the people” (ibid 164) acting 
in the interest of the represented but, nevertheless, acting according to his own judgement. 
John Stuart Mill put greater emphasis on the plurality of views in the debate. He called for a 
“Congress of Opinions; an arena in which not only the general opinion of the nation, but that 
of every section of it, and as far as possible of every eminent individual whom it contains, can 
produce itself in full light and challenge discussion; where every person in the country may 
count upon finding somebody who speaks his mind (…) in the face of opponents, to be tested 
by adverse controversy; where those whose opinion is overruled, feel satisfied that it is heard, 
and set aside not by a mere act of will, but for what are thought superior reasons (…)” (Mill 
(1861) 1969: 187). Correspondingly, a representative should be more an agent than a trustee. 
Whereas Burke sees the function of a representative body more in arriving at consensus, Mill 
sees it “as more critical than constructive” (Pitkin 1969: 21).  
What is the dilemma of representation? When representation means a substantive acting for 
others in the interest of others, the relation between the represented and the representative is 
                                                 
2 For the sake of clarity, I should mention that I use the term ‘democracy’ in its contemporary meaning; James 
Madison, Abbé Sieyès, and Immanuel Kant called the representative system that they favoured ‘republic’.  
3 The idea that deputies represent the will of the nation, not the will of the people, is also expressed in the French 
constitution of 1791.  
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crucial. The “mandate-independence controversy” (Pitkin 1967: 144-167) has plagued 
political theorists over the centuries. When representation is conceived of as “acting in the 
interest of the represented” it all depends on how “in the interest of” is defined: Is it interest 
the way the represented see it, or the way the representative interpret the interest of the 
represented or is the representative free in her or his judgement to define what is ‘objectively’ 
in the interest of the represented? Insisting on individual positions may produce sub-optimal 
solutions and the projection of such an outcome gives good reason to discard the view that 
mandating is the best way to achieve representation. The historical texts quoted above already 
tell us that the preference for either more independence or for stricter control correlates with 
the author’s image of citizens: Those who are sceptical concerning the advance of 
‘civilisation’ in terms of self-constraint of passion and the diffusion of rationality and 
knowledge will plea in favour of institutions that further deliberation and reasoning. In 
addition, the preference correlates with the assessment of what is at stake in politics: is 
politics about hard choices between irreconcilable values and interests, or is it about 
ascertaining the common good? Furthermore, the task attributed to the representative is 
closely related to the political function attributed to representation. When representation is 
meant to support the exercise of authority then consensus building is put first; when its main 
function is the control of power, representation is expected to privilege the views of the 
represented. Context conditions may further influence the exercise of representation. In a 
conflict ridden society with multiple cleavages, the represented will strive to closely monitor 
their representatives; from this an antagonistic or, at least, a pluralistic system of 
representation is likely to emerge. Even then, a certain degree of independence is needed in 
order to come to political agreement. In a society where conflicts are more about the means 
than the ends of policies, the represented may be less inclined to inspect the representation of 
her or his interests. But, in spite of the represented’s wide spread apathy, representation might 
turn out to be close to the interests of the individual.  
From the classical literature I conclude that representation should be looked at from two 
different perspectives. The pertinent questions are: 
1. What is the function of representation? In a ‘constructive’ approach it is to support 
the ‘convergence of wills’. In a ‘critical’ approach it is “to throw the light of 
publicity” on the acts of government (Mill 1969: 186). Consequently, representation 
may be more closely associated with output legitimacy or with input legitimacy. 
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2. What is the task of the representative? An ‘agent’ is expected to represent the 
preferences of the represented and, consequently she or he is subject to what Sartori 
(1968) called ‘personal responsibility’. The ‘trustee’ has to bridge the preferences of 
the represented with principles and norms and hence has also to live up to ‘functional 
responsibility’. In the case of the EU, functional responsibility relates to adhering to 
the Treaties and also to the ‘finalité politique’ and the ‘acquis communautaire’.  
 
How do we know if representation lives up to our normative standards? From the classical 
literature we take the view that the normative quality of representation is defined by the 
presence of representativeness, reliability, responsibility, and accountability. Political 
institutions have been designed to secure representation, but institutions as such do not 
provide a yardstick for measuring the quality of representation; the occurrence of elections is 
hardly a reliable indicator. Scholars investigating representative government have developed 
an analytical framework to grasp the phenomenon of representation and to evaluate the 
capacity of institutions. Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski and Susan Stokes (1999) define 
representation as “a relation between interests and outcomes” that develops in a process and 
includes different phases. The analytical model distinguishes different components of this 
process: preferences, signals, mandates, policies, and outcomes. Looking at the ‘internal’ 
relations between these components it opens the black box of the represented-representative 
relationship (Manin et. al. 1999: 8-9). The relevant actors in this abstract relation are on the 
one hand citizens and ‘the people’, and, on the other, a government. The represented are 
citizens who voice preferences and people who share a collective interest. A government is 
responsive to the degree that it responds to signals of preferences and/or to the policy choices 
expressed through elections or votes (mandates). A government is representative to the extent 
that it acts in the public interest.  
Since the analytical concept has been developed for the study of representative government in 
nation states, it cannot be applied straightforwardly to the EU. The reason is not that the EU is 
a multi-level system of governance, which is also a feature common to all federations. The 
reason is that the EU differs from national federal polities in two respects: First, it is a 
political system that is not built on a political community; it rather is a union of ‘peoples’ as it 
is stated in the preamble of the Treaty. The future prospect of a European demos is highly 
controversial, but what is not contested is that at present it does not exist. Similarly, it is not 
contested that the EU is governed without a government. When the term ‘government’ is used 
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(Hix 2005), it connotes rather the “powers of government” that the EU institutions have taken 
on and exercise in cooperation with each other. Thus two components of the model suggested 
by Manin et al. are of a different nature; this calls for re-designing the analytical approach.  
How can we best adapt the analytical model to the EU system? That re-designing will 
consider the specific characteristics of the institutional architecture of the EU and the rules 
and procedures that channel EU-society relations. The latter respond to the discourse on 
improving the democratic legitimacy of the EU that was prevalent in the last ten years. This 
discourse concentrated on two core concepts, namely on the benefits of civil society and the 
promises of participatory governance. The political relevance of this discourse is evident in 
the new Treaty provisions, which oblige EU institutions “to maintain an open, transparent and 
regular dialogue with representative associations and with civil society.4 Though all EU 
institutions are addressed indiscriminately, the concept of governance put the Commission 
centre stage. The Commission takes a prominent position in the policy-making process and it 
also presents itself as the most relevant partner in participatory governance. From the early 
1990s, it has developed an elaborate ‘consultation regime’ (Kohler-Koch 2008). This regime 
accentuates the principle of openness, transparency and participation and entails minimum 
standards for consultation. Furthermore, the Commission reformed procedures (impact 
assessments; road maps of consultations; feed-back on consultations) and created new 
instruments (such as online-consultations). Thus, the institutionalisation of EU-society 
relations is centred on the Commission. Therefore, and in view of its crucial position in EU 
policy making, the Commission can be taken as a substitute for ‘government’. But the role of 
civil society is not so easily defined.  
 
2. Linking civil society and EU representation 
 
Some authors will categorically question the linkage between civil society and representation. 
From their theoretical perspective no organisation 'represents' civil society; civil society is a 
space of participation, not representation (Marlies Glasius in a letter to the author). The 
different views on civil society pertain to divergent theoretical conceptions and are linked to 
distinct research questions. Civil society as a space of participation is mostly an issue in 
research on local grass roots activism and global civil society. The concept of civil society is 
notoriously ambiguous, and different schools of thought have nourished divergent 
                                                 
4 First in the Constitutional Treaty (Art. 47) and now in the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 8B). 
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conceptions and supported the use and misuse of the concept in political practice (Jobert and 
Kohler-Koch 2008). Furthermore, academic disciplines have their distinct research agendas 
and sociologists tend to approach the subject from a different perspective to political 
scientists. Those who are primarily interested in the formation of a European political society 
(Fossum and Trenz 2006; Trenz 2007) will take a different stance from those who want to 
know how the programmatic ‘involvement of civil society’ in EU governance is taking shape 
and if it holds the promises of ‘participatory democracy’ (Kohler-Koch 2008). From both 
perspectives the issue of representation might be addressed, though in quite a different way. 
Scholars who take an interest in the EU as an emerging polity and a political society in the 
making relate representation to the formation of that social constituency. It is an abstract 
representation that equates civil society with an active European citizenship. By this reading, 
European citizenship is not just a set of rights conferred on the citizens by the EU, it is rather 
a social relationship that stems from citizens lining up with others and participating in 
political discourse and structures of governance that stretch beyond national borders (Bellamy 
and Warleigh 2001: 6)5.  
John Erik Fossum and Hans-Jörg Trenz share this sociological approach and argue that the 
process of European constitution-making sets off a dynamic of social constituency building. 
In their conception “(…) the EU’s social constituency is conceived of as the ‘collective 
representation of the people’, which tells us what the Europeans have in common.” (Fossum 
and Trenz 2006: 61) Hans-Jörg Trenz (2007: 17; 2005) sees “civil society as a discursive 
formation within the public sphere”. The constitutional debates (especially when they gained 
high levels of publicity during the referenda in France and the Netherlands), but also the 
policy of EU participatory governance promote societal self-description. ‘Citizens’ and ‘civil 
society’ are addressed by EU institutions as partners in EU governance; this conveys a certain 
social imaginary. Likewise, those who address demands to the EU that refer to general 
interests and basic rights present them not as individual claims, but as if it were ‘in the name 
of the public’. This interactive process and, above all the search for legitimacy, supports the 
construction of what I have called an ‘imaginary representation’. As Hans-Jörg Trenz has 
argued in his response: “(…)it is not substantiated through procedural designs or socio-
structural determinants. In this quality, the EU’s social constituency is foremost a formation 
of discourse. It is a discourse made up of claims for representation and legitimacy that 
operates through the imaginary of European (civil) society.” (Trenz 2007: 16) When we 
follow his proposition that “(s)ocieties exist through the practice of their own representation” 
                                                 
5 check original quote 
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(ibid: 18) our attention is directed towards the “(…) autopoietic practice of reproducing and 
circulating meaning of societal unity and collective self-determination” (ibid). 
‘Representation’ is thus linked to the formation of a ‘political society’ and addresses a 
component of ‘democratic government’ in the well-known Lincoln quote that is often 
neglected: democratic government is not only government by the people and for the people, 
but also of the people. Thus the link to the question of democracy is quite apparent, but 
representation in this perspective is a different kind of category to the one we dealt with in the 
first part of the paper. It does not address the relation between represented and representatives 
and the core criteria meant to capture the main features of democratic representation are not 
applicable, namely representativeness, reliability, responsibility and accountability.  
The second image of civil society, which comes closer to the political discourse, sits a bit 
uneasily between deliberative democracy and conceptions of political representation. Again, 
civil society is the (emerging) political community of the Union, an imaginary European 
people which constitutes the polity and simultaneously is the source of demands on and 
support to the political system of the EU. Civil society as such has no actor quality in a system 
of political representation. This comes with ‘organised civil society’. Civil society 
associations have a performative function. They form and transform civil society through 
discourse and interaction in the public sphere; they make civil society visible and give societal 
interests a voice. Organised civil society is said to compensate for the deficiencies of present 
day democracies by rejuvenating citizens’ participation, by reaching out from the grass roots 
to far away Brussels and by bringing Europe closer to the people. Thus organised civil society 
is an asset for democratic input legitimacy. 
Organised civil society is also attractive as a partner in governance. It is expected to voice the 
diversity of interests and views and to bring the knowledge and down-to-earth experience of 
citizens into the policy-making process. Thus, civil society organisations are invited to give 
advice and to participate formally and actively in the collective decision-making process to 
improve the quality of EU governance. In other words, they are expected to contribute to 
output legitimacy. 
By this approach, civil society associations are multi-functional: They are important as such 
and they have an instrumental value. They constitute the emergent European civil society and 
contribute to its on-going formation. The democratic credentials of civil society rest with their 
importance for the constitution of a public sphere. Civil society provides the societal 
infrastructure for public deliberation which is for Habermas and other proponents of 
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deliberative democracy at the heart of democracy.6 However, as Rainer Schmalz-Bruns has 
pointed out “(…) a deliberative perspective puts emphasis not only on internally deliberative 
procedures, but on an institutional system such that the different parts (on different levels) of 
the system may reflexively act upon each other and where a variety of democratic forms 
comes into play – a deliberative system which then also should allow different modes of 
political interaction and of reaching agreements to play their role.” (Schmalz-Bruns 2007: 
293) 
When we translate this idea into a more parsimonious model we can see that civil society 
organisations are under stress because they are asked to perform at different plays at different 
theatres at the same time. Civil society organisations provide the “institutional core” of civil 
society and “anchor the communication structures of the public sphere in the society 
component of the lifeworld.” (Habermas 1996: 367) The European Union is, however, a 
composite system and comprises numerous national civil societies which are separate from 
but also linked to a trans-national European and global civil society. At the same time they are 
incorporated in the institutions of representative democracy. Civil society organisations are 
actors in the intermediary public space and called upon to link citizens to government by 
exerting influence on government and by being a partner in governance. It is an attribution of 
different, even contradictory roles, and this will have an impact on role behaviour and 
performance.7 
But what kind of societal associations qualify as civil society organisations? Habermas (1996) 
highlights their role as intermediaries that relate citizens’ experiences in the private sphere to 
the formal political decision-making processes via the public sphere. This draws a line 
between civil society organisations and the ordinary interest groups not by referring to the 
‘organisational purpose’ but to the communicative practices and the tight connection to the 
public sphere. Thus it would be difficult to exclude associations a priori just on the basis of 
what they stand for and what part of society they represent. The emphasis on communication 
emanates from the core proposition of deliberative democracy that “under modern conditions 
normativity cannot but be derived from intersubjectivity” (Schmalz-Bruns 2007: 284) which 
calls for the inclusion of a maximum range of voices in public deliberations. This is important 
because civil society’s influence has to be exerted through the public sphere: "Not influence 
                                                 
6 I do not go more into detail on the relevance of civil society for deliberative democracy for three reasons: (1) 
With respect to my commentators it would be like carrying coal to Newcastle (see among others Schmalz-Bruns 
2007; Weale 2007), (2) the paper is getting too long anyway, (3) Christoph Humrich, Barbara Finke and I 
(Kohler-Koch et al. 2006) have covered it in another paper.  
7 In another paper we elaborate this idea and present some first empirical insights, see Kohler-
Koch/Quittkat/Buth 2008. 
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per se, but influence transformed into communicative power legitimates political decisions" 
(Habermas 1996: 371).  
EU civil society associations, for their part, have chosen purpose as their differentiating 
criterion, claiming that they represent the ‘rights and value based NGO sector”8. Most 
scholars working on civil society make the same distinction when they are asked to categorize 
different kinds of associations. In a survey with close to a hundred respondents from academia 
the overwhelming majority (85%) classified associations representing ‘general interests’ as 
‘qualifying as civil society organisations’.9 The interests are ‘general’ in the sense that they 
are shared by a wider constituency than the membership of the association or that they even 
cannot get organised at all. When asked for a definition that would come closest to their 
understanding of civil society, most opted equally for a programmatic approach and a 
Habermasian concept. This may be read as a confirmation of the prevailing ambiguity: Civil 
society is linked to the idea of democracy with a strong and vibrant public sphere and also to 
the idea of a plurality of representative organisations channelling the interests of citizens to 
government.  
The latter conceptualisation looks like a clear case for the study of democratic representation. 
It resonates with the pluralistic image of civil society as EU institutions see it: “Civil society 
includes all those voluntary and non-profit organisations which play an important role in 
giving voice to the concerns of citizens and in delivering services that meet people’s needs.” 
(Commission 2001: 15)10 Citizens are represented in EU governance by civil society 
organisations; it is a case of representation built on the aggregation of preferences formation 
and democratic control.  
The discursive image of civil society does not attribute a representative role to civil society 
associations; rather they are part of and feeding into the public discourse. They respond to the 
changing societal environment and bring new themes and issues for deliberation into the 
public sphere. Political institutions are under the pressure of ‘communicative power’; civil 
society organisations may augment this pressure by building up societal consensus in public 
discourse. But influence comes with the better argument or through the mechanisms of 
representative democracy. Representation is not a role conferred on actors but emanating from 
discourse. To make it happen at the EU level civil society organisations need a friendly 
institutional environment that gives room and opportunities for building a public space. 
                                                 
8 See for example the self-ascription of the Civil Society Contact Group; for more details see Kohler-
Koch/Quittkat/Buth 2008. 
9 Kohler-Koch/Quittkat 2008. 
10 Here the Commission refers to an earlier definition by the European Economic and Social Committee. 
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Consequently, it makes little sense to ask whether individual civil society organisations are 
representative or accountable. What matters is their communicative capacity, the diversity of 
views offered in the public arena, the quality of the deliberative discourse and the publicity it 
receives. Therefore, the focus of research should be on the emergence (or not) of a civil 
society discourse at the EU level and how it connects with the many national and sub-national 
civil society discourses.  
 
3 Assessing representation and organised civil society in the EU 
In recent years, political discourse revolved around strengthening efficient and democratic EU 
governance not least by involving civil society. The constitutional debate and the EU’s policy 
on EU governance are rhetorically committed to the model of ‘participatory democracy’. It is 
meant to complement the elements of representative democracy on which the EU is founded, 
namely the electoral representation of citizens in Parliament and member state representation 
in the European Council and in the Council.11 The upgrading of the ‘civil dialogue’ and of 
consultations is an instrument to boost first of all the legitimacy of the Commission. This 
move reflects a general trend towards establishing direct working relations between society 
and the political administration. Therefore, when addressing the issue of civil society and 
representation, the Commission immediately comes to the fore. Nevertheless, it has to be 
acknowledged that Commission-society relations are just one facet of representation and that 
a just assessment of the system of EU representation has to take a broader view. Nevertheless, 
in the following paragraph I will concentrate on this segment of reality. 
Representation in Commission-civil society relations 
I will first turn to the aggregate conception of representation and present an adapted version 
of the analytical model which was discussed in the first chapter (Manin et. al. 1999).  
The analytical model presented in Figure 1 demonstrates a two-layered relation of 
representativeness and also a two-layered system of accountability/responsiveness, both of 
which are supposed to support representation: Civil society organisations at the EU level give 
expression to citizens’ preferences by responding to ‘signals’ (such as public opinion polls, 
media coverage of public debates) and/or to demands directly addressed to them either by 
ordinary citizens or by their members (by mandating representatives through elections) or 
                                                 
11 See Lisbon Treaty, article 8A. 
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supporters. Civil society organisations, on their part, will channel the (aggregated) preferences 
into the decision-making process by interacting with the Commission. 
 
Figure 1: Representation: responsiveness and accountability 
 First order responsiveness/ideational acc.      Second order responsiveness/ideational accountability 
      
Citizens’                      signals         
preferences           ECJ 
               CSO  Commission         Council 
   national         positions  policy proposal  EP 
   public         
   discourses       
 followers’/   
members’        mandates       
 preferences       horizontal accountability 
 
                  reliability  
CSO 
positions 
CSO 
positions 
            material accountability  
                “double” arrows from left to right indicate the chain of giving input 
 
Representativity 
A key issue of democratic representation is ‘equal’ representation and this comes with the 
representativeness of the actors involved and the representativity of the contributions.  
‘Representativeness’ ranks high on the Brussels political agenda.12 It is looked at from two 
different perspectives; one focusing attention on the individual organisation, the other on the 
spectrum of organisations. The Commission made it an issue that transparency and 
responsibility should also apply to all those who want to be involved in the policy-making 
                                                 
12 See the different efforts by the EESC, commissioned academics, and Commission-stakeholder groups to 
define criteria; see also the debate in the context of the ‘Transparency Initiative’. 
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process. The mantra is that “With better involvement comes greater responsibility” 
(Commission 2001: 15) and that all parties involved have to know if the claims put forward 
by an organisation are reflecting the concerns of the membership or constituency of the 
respective association. All groups voicing an interest should be responsive and held 
accountable. Though it is agreed that more transparency on representativeness is needed, 
criteria are still rather vague and highly disputed. Even quantitative criteria such as the range 
of countries represented, the numbers of members and individual membership at the national, 
sub-national or local level are contested. Not all groups are member based associations and 
even if they are, it is debatable whether the organisations’ support base in the member states 
could be measured by numbers.13 
Representativeness is also an issue when looking at the whole range of societal actors asking 
for participation. This time responsibility lies with the EU institutions that are asked to look 
for more balanced participation. In recent years the Commission has successfully lowered the 
threshold of access to consultation. When one looks at the numbers, sector and territorial 
representation are still grossly unbalanced; producer interests and groups coming from the 
centre-northwest of the EU still outnumber all others. The actors involved downgrade the 
quantitative aspect and rather focus on the asymmetrical distribution of resources. Policy 
arguments are won or lost, so the argument goes, on available evidence; therefore, the ability 
of a group to produce the necessary evidence in time affects the balance of decision-making. 
This brought the issue of funding into sharp focus in recent years.14 At present, a broad 
consensus prevails that EU institutions should ensure that they invite and take account of all 
views and concerns of stakeholders. Consultation mechanisms should put the principles of 
openness and transparency into practice, and support equal access and voice. Funding for the 
purpose of facilitating a more active involvement of certain groups, is still a contested issue. 
 
Accountability is a core mechanism to ensure democratic representation. When applied to the 
Commission accountability comes in different forms: namely, legal, administrative, political, 
and even peer review accountability. It is, consequently, a multi dimensional relation. In the 
first instance, accountability involves a horizontal relation. The Commission is accountable to 
other EU institutions either on political (European Parliament, Council) or legal (European 
Court of Justice) grounds. Political control by the European Parliament is well established and 
                                                 
13 Even more controversial is the EESC’s suggestion that the representativeness of European organisations hinge 
on having member organisations at member state level, which should “be recognised as being representative of 
the interests they represent.” European Economic and Social Committee 2006: 11. 
14 See the report of the Peer Review Group on Stakeholder Involvement (Commission 2007). 
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has grown over the years. The Council does not have a formal right to hold the Commission 
to account. However, we argue that when the Council is rejecting a Commission proposal it is 
a case of accountability, since the Commission “has to face consequences” (Bovens 2007). 
The judicial control of the European Court of Justice is the most visible form of ‘horizontal 
accountability’ (O’Donnell 1994). The second relation is a vertical one: accountability 
extends directly to civil society organisations and, due to these organisations’ intermediary 
function, to the different constituencies. The functional role attributed to civil society 
organisations is to make this system of accountability relations work. A necessary prerequisite 
is the transparency of policy-making in agenda setting, political deliberation and negotiation 
right up to decision-making and implementation: Are documents and political processes 
visible to the attentive organisations or not? A second prerequisite is that nothing impedes 
civil society organisations from effectively pushing publicity.  
It is undeniable that much progress has been made in the previous decade with respect to the 
access to documents, the transparency of the decision making process through the publication 
of legislative roadmaps, and opening comitology and expert groups (Brandsma and Curtin 
2007; Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2008). But it is also undeniable that this process is not yet 
complete, and that success varies from one DG to another. Furthermore, we have to ask 
wether civil society organisations really can have an impact that amounts to political 
accountability. Political accountability should “induce responsiveness of the rulers to the 
preferences of the citizenry” (Bovens 2007: 443). Accountability is a relationship between an 
actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her 
conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face 
consequences.“ (Bovens 2007: 450) 
Despite improvements with respect to the preconditions of accountability, civil society can 
hold the Commission to account only in a rather soft way. It may ring the fire-alarm to 
promote horizontal accountability. It may pressure the Commission to provide feed-back to 
civil society organisations in the consultation process (Commission 2007). But the 
Commission up to now is not legally obliged to explain and justify its behaviour and will only 
have to face the soft consequences of ‘blaming and shaming’. Accordingly, I call this 
‘ideational accountability’. European civil society organisations, for their part, have to give 
account to their members or constituencies and have to face severe consequences, either 
through the mechanism of elections or through donations. This I call ‘material accountability’. 
Quite obviously, the Commission does not face material accountability and a direct vertical 
link of accountability to the citizens does not exist at all.  
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Assessing the soft modes of accountability brings us back to the discursive approach of 
judging representation. It draws attention to different kinds of accountability and different 
modes of exerting accountability. The Commission has a ‘functional responsibility’ as the 
‘guardian of the Treaties’, as promoter of the ‘ever closer Union’ and as a custodian of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Without a functioning mechanism of political accountability, 
this functional responsibility relies upon the Commission’s normative orientation. Norm 
orientations are, however, not just contingent on individual belief systems and embedded in 
institutions; they are sustained and altered in public discourse.  
The pertinent question than is whether a public discourse will evolve around the participatory 
governance process that includes both the Commission and civil society actors. The 
interaction between the Commission and civil society organisations is mostly a vertical 
relation, predominantly issue specific and, consequently, highly segmented. Initiatives have 
been launched in recent years to encourage horizontal communication between civil society 
organisations, and sector associations have established network alliances and formed 
permanent platforms. Also the Commission has been eager to support dialogues for cross-
cutting issues, not least to attain more policy coherence. For the observer it is difficult to 
judge whether and to what intensity a discursive dialogue takes place in these institutions. The 
limited publicity makes it safe to conclude that all these interactions far from constitute an EU 
level ‘civil society’ discourse. 
Individual civil society organisations may raise their voice and gain publicity, but without an 
arena for the public exchange of views citizens will be unaware of what civil society 
associations collectively have to say. Only the Commission can obtain an encompassing 
picture of cleavage lines, and majority and minority views. It may acquire such knowledge 
either by adding up the individual positions of the numerous interest groups which are 
approaching it bilaterally or by providing a space for multilateral deliberation. Here it is 
worthwhile recalling John Stuart Mill: Representation needs an arena in which every section 
of public opinion “can produce itself in full light and challenge discussion; where every 
person in the country may count upon finding somebody who speaks his mind (…) in the face 
of opponents, to be tested by adverse controversy (…)” (Mill (1861) 1969: 187). In recent 
years the Commission has institutionalised a process of ‘open consultation’ including fora that 
offer a platform for public dispute and discourse among civil society organisations. The 
Commission has the role of a facilitator and mediator, and with ‘good reasons’ takes sides in 
the discourse. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Commission portrays itself as 
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representing the European “common interest” (Commission 2001). Does, as a consequence, 
representation rests with the Commission? 
The model as heuristic devise 
Does the model help us to re-establish ‘representation’ as a meaningful category through 
which to assess the role of civil society in the Union? Firstly, it provides criteria for a 
normative assessment. Representation is supported by the horizontal accountability of the 
Commission vis-à-vis the Court, the Council and the European Parliament. The assessment of 
the quality of this type of accountability is decisive for judging the Commission’s claim to be 
acting ‘in the European interest’. Looking to the other side, representation is linked to 
responsiveness and accountability vis-à-vis the EU’s constituency as represented by civil 
society. Accountability is clearly lacking. Responsiveness gains normative value if it is 
supported by representativeness. Since different normative theories of democracy suggest 
different criteria to judge the democratic quality of representativeness, empirical data will be 
interpreted in different ways.15  
The model also puts in perspective the normative limitations of the Commission’s claim on 
representation. It is part of the EU’s system of ‘composite representation’ (Benz 1998) and the 
legitimacy of the Commission’s claim to “represent the European interest” must be assessed 
against the competing claims of the Council and the Parliament. The competing claims are 
based on different normative grounds that reflect specific political philosophies. 
Parliamentary representation is founded on the equal rights of citizens to partake in political 
rule; member state representation is founded on the federal principle to give political rights to 
(national) political entities; the Commission’s representation in the aggregate model is mainly 
functional since it is representing citizens as ‘stakeholders’. Whereas representation in 
parliament is based on the idea that politics is about contested decisions and, consequently, 
that representation has to be organised through competitive elections, the federal principle 
gives priority to the accommodation of competing interests between established political 
communities. Functional representation has a technocratic bias: The argument is that civil 
society organisations ought to pass on the interests of citizens as stakeholders, and deliver 
expert knowledge; in a process of deliberation and mutual learning, the ‘co-operative state’, 
represented here by the Commission, will then arrive at the best problem-solving strategy. 
Hard choices between values and irreconcilable interests are negated or deferred to the 
‘political’ decision of the Council and the Parliament.  
                                                 
15 Kohler-Koch/Finke (2007) offer two alternative theoretical conceptions to assess the democratic quality of 
representativeness. 
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Apart from conceptual clarification, the model is a heuristic devise for empirically exploring 
the quality of representation. When we link representation to first and second order 
responsiveness and reliability, we gain indicators that can be measured and that will indicate 
divergent degrees of representation. Furthermore, we can explore the conditions for ‘better’ 
representation by asking what contributes to responsiveness and reliability. Empirical research 
should focus, first, on the institutionalisation of different mechanisms of soft accountability 
and how they operate in daily routines. Second, responsiveness may be used as an indicator of 
the effectiveness of these soft modes of accountability. 
 
To conclude: The intention of this paper has been to probe the relevance of a central category 
of democratic political theory for analysing EU-society relations and for judging democratic 
relevance. The paper first clarified the concepts of representation and of civil society, both of 
which are plagued with ambiguities. It drew attention to the divergent conceptualisations that 
emanate from theories of liberal democracy and deliberative democracy respectively. But 
irrespective of theoretical positions, the paper concludes that civil society and representation 
entail an awkward relationship in democratic terms.  
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